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THE INDUSTRY COMMITTEE PROVISIONS OF
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
By ELROY D. GOLDINGt
DURING the past decade, it has become increasingly apparent that
wage rates are subject in considerable measure to the control of private,
semi-monopolistic organizations of capital and labor.' Thus far it has not
been proved that any general policy of destroying these combinations
can or should be an effective part of a national economic program. Fur-
thermore, even in areas of the economy where wage-fixation by strong
combinations is of little significance, the labor market generally exhibits
few of the characteristics which the economist attributes to a perfectly
competitive market. Consequently, in formulating a national wage policy
for the immediate future, it is more useful to compare the relative
advantages of different methods of wage fixation by public and private
action than it is to contrast experience under a working system of govern-
mental wage regulation with the theoretically predictable results of wage
fixation by the forces of perfect competition.
Until recently any attempt to compare the merits of different wage-
fixing institutions would have been premature. In 1923 the Supreme
Court had restricted the power to fix wages within narrow limits, in-
hibiting for a decade legislative experimentation with wage fixing devices.'
Reconsideration in 1937 of the view that minimum wage legislation
per se constitutes a deprivation of substantive due process followed
resurgence of popular interest in minimum wage legislation.
3 Thus as-
sured that the general principle of minimum wage legislation would
receive judicial approval, Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938. It was not, however, until two recent Supreme Court
tMember of the Illinois Bar; Sterling Fellow, Yale University School of Law,,,
1940-41. The writer is greatly indebted to Professor A. . Feller of the Yale Law
School for his valuable guidance.
1. For an excellent statement viewing the Fair Labor Standards Act as a phase
of the development of restraints upon economic freedom, see Fleming, The Free Enter-
prise System as a Way of Life, Wage & Hour Release No. G-44, June 13, 1940 (address).
2. Adlins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
3. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
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decisions, United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,4 and Opp Cotton Mills
v. Wage and Hour Administrator,' that the scope of federal power to
adopt alternative methods of wage-fixation was clarified. Such judicial
clarification makes significant a consideration of the extent to which
administrative experience under the Fair Labor Standards Act' indicates
the relative merits of different methods of wage-fixation.
LEGAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE ADOPTION OF ALTERNATIVE
METHODS OF WAGE-FIXATION
In drafting a statute designed to establish a wage-fixing mechanism
the significant problems are the definition of the standards to be employed
in fixing wages, the selection of an agency to administer those standards,
and the establishment of a procedure for the agency to follow in apply-
ing the standards. Standards may be prescribed in the form of a rigid
statutory wage scale; or, at the opposite extreme, wage-fixing authority
may be delegated to the uncontrolled discretion of an administrative
agency. The wage-fixing agency may be either Congress, a professional
administrator, or private interested persons. Procedures followed by
the agency may be the informal techniques of investigation, synthesis,
and decision characteristic of the legislative process or the adversary
formalities characteristic of the judicial process. It is believed that the
Darby and Opp cases, read in the light of the language and legislative
history of the Fair Labor Standards Act, indicate that any of the possible
alternatives with respect to standards, agencies, and procedures will be
deemed proper as long as they do not, without cause, affect one defin-
able interest differently from another.7
Standards to be Invoked in Fixing Wages
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, provision is made for a grad-
uated scheme under which all employers subject to jurisdiction of the
Act are required, at stated intervals, to increase minimum rates from
twenty-five to thirty and then to forty cents an hour." At any time
before the statutory rate of forty cents becomes effective, the minimum
wage rate for a given industry may be fixed at not over forty cents by
4. 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (U. S. 1941), 35 ILL. L. RwE. 840. For discussion of the effect of
this case upon the interpretation of the Tenth Amendment see Feller, The Tenth Amend-
inent Retires (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 223. On constitutionality generally, see Comment
(1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 646. See also Comment (1941) 35 ILL. L. REv. 875.
5. 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (U. S. 1941).
6. For a general discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Symposium (1939)
6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 321. Brief historical treatments of American wage-fixing
experiments may be found in THE MINIMUM WAGE (Int. Lab. Office Publications Ser.
D, No. 22, 1939) 192-95; ANN. REP. WAGE & HOUR Div. 1939 (1940) 1-3.
7. See pp. 1155-57, 1175 infra.
8. 52 STAT. 1062 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §206 (Supp. 1939). The flat statutory mini-
mum of forty cents becomes effective June 25, 1945.
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a committee for the industry acting with the approval of the "Wage and
Hour Administrator.'
In the Darby case the petitioner claimed that the system of statutory
flat minima constituted a deprivation of due process of law because it
was unsupported by factual investigation. The Supreme Court avoided
the issue by remarking generally that "it is no longer open to question
that the fixing of a minimum wage is within the legislative power."1
Thus, under the Darby decision, Congress apparently has unlimited power
to enact minimum wage schedules.
In the Opp case the petitioner contended that the industry committee
provisions constituted an improper delegation of power to fix wages
pending the effective date of flat minima because the standards for ad-
ministrative action were too indefinite. The standards in question provide
that the wage-fixing power is to be used to permit attainment, as rapidly
as is "economically feasible," of a universal minimum wage of forty
cents an hour. The minimum wage rate for any "industry" is to be the
highest (not in excess of forty cents an hour) which "having due regard
to economic and competitive conditions will not substantially curtail
employment in the industry." The industry committee for any industry
is required, however, to "recommend" to the Wage and Hour Admin-
istrator the establishment of such "reasonable classifications" within any
industry as are necessary
"for the purpose of fixing for each classification . . . the highest
minimum wage rate . . . which (1) will not substantially curtail
employment in such classification and (2) will not give a competi-
tive advantage to any group in the industry"
and
"shall recommend for each classification in the industry the highest
minimum wage rate which . . . will not substantially curtail em-
ployment in such classification."
No classification is to be made by the administrative agency "solely" on
a regional or sex basis, but in determining what classifications are to be
made and in determining the rates for such classifications, the admin-
istrative agency shall "consider" "among other relevant factors" the
following: "competitive conditions as affected by transportation, living
and production costs"; wages established for work of like character
by collective agreements; and the wages paid for work of like character
by employers who "voluntarily" maintain fair labor standards."
9. 52 STAT. 1063, 1064 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §§205, 208 (Supp. 1939).
10. 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 462 (U. S. 1941).
11. These are some obvious ambiguities in these clauses: (1) The rate set is to be
the highest not in excess of forty cents an hour which "having due regard for competi-
tive conditions" "will not substantially curtail employment." This phraseology may mean
either that any rate set shall be one which after inquiry into economic and competitive
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In denying that these standards constituted an improper delegation
of legislative power, the Supreme Court in the Opp case asserted that
the basic standard is the provision that the administrative agency is to
set the highest wage, not in excess of forty cents an hour, which will
not substantially curtail employment. The process of determining whether
differentials are needed to accomplish this basic purpose is denominated
by the Court as a "fact-finding" process which Congress might properly
conditions is found to result in no substantial curtailment of employment. Cf. § 8(c) (to
the words "and recommend"). Or it may mean that the wage set must be one which
neither causes substantial curtailment of employment nor fails to give due regard to eco-
nomic and competitive conditions. Cf. §8(c) (from the words "and recommend").
(2) Industry committees are directed to recommend such classifications as are deter-
mined to be necessary "for the purpose of fixing for each classification . . . the highest
minimum wage rate . . . which (1) will not substantially curtail employment in such
classification and (2) will not give a competitiv'e advantage to any group in the industry."
(Italics supplied).
The direction seems inconsistent with the later request that there be recommended
for each classification in the industry "the highest minimum wage rate which will not
substantially curtail employment in such classification." The inconsistency can be resolved
only by ignoring the italicized words.
(3) Is a "competitive advantage" given by confirming the existing wage structure, or
by fixing a wage which would harm some producers but not others? It must have been
contemplated that the legislation would harm particular producers, or it would have
been improper to provide as a declared objective of the legislation the attainment of a
universal forty cent minimum.
(4) One of two strained statutory interpretations is necessary in order to reconcile
the imperative mandate to set the highest minimum rate "without substantially curtail-
ing employment" with the command to establish differentials which will not "substan-
tially curtail employment" in any "classification" of the industry. If it may be assumed
that there is substantial curtailment of "employment" whenever there is substantial cur-
tailment of "employment in a classification," it is difficult to see why the statute em-
ploys both phraseologies. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that differentials are to be
established above and not below the minimum, all statutory language is given some sig-
nification. See Comment (1941) 35 ILL. L. REv. 840, 846. But if this interpretation
is sound, there is no textual explanation of the failure of Congress to indicate that only
differentials above the minimum were to be permissible. This failure is particularly
striking since some employers had urged the establishment of differentials above industry
minima and others had urged the establishment of rates below industry minima. Legis-
lative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act is helpful in this connection only by point-
ing out that it was expected that particular rates would be proper even though they
caused hardship and unemployment to some persons. SEN. REP. No. 884, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937) 4; H. R. REP. No. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 8; 81 CoxG. REC.
7805, 7661 (1937); 81 CONG. REC. APPENDix 1993 (1937); 82 CONG. REc. 1819-20, 1392
1486-89, 1471 (1937); 82 CONG. REc. APPENDIX 303-04 (1937); 83 CoNG. REV. 7290
(1938).
(5) Although the administrative agency is directed to "consider" enumerated and
other "relevant" factors in determining the need for and size of wage differentials, no
test is afforded by which it can be determined what facts are sufficiently relevant to be
"considered" and what factors "considered" must be given weight. Cf. pp. 1169-75 infra.
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delegate to an administrative agency. The agency's determinations on
questions of fact are to be conclusive if supported by "substantial evi-
dence."' But the Court's treatment of the differential-fixing process as
one of fact-finding is unrealistic. Actually, control over differentials
gives the administrative agency power to settle important questions of
policy. This can be clearly demonstrated by examination of the legis-
lative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Since fixation of a minimum wage at any level would be harmful to
some employers and beneficial to others, employer interests represented
at Congressional hearings were irreconcilably divided upon the question
of the desirability of minimum wage legislation. Some employers vir-
tually unaffected by a proposed forty cent minimum' 3 opposed minimum
wage legislation in toto, perhaps on the theory that legislative enactment
of a minimum wage fixing scheme would be followed sooner or later by
fixation of wages at higher levels. 14 The possibility of a defeat upon the
general issue of the desirability of minimum wage legislation induced
low wage employers to demand differentials in their favor ;"G high wage
12. 61 Sup. Ct. 524, 533 (U. S. 1941).
13. No available statistics estimate by industries the number of employees receiving
less than 40 cents an hour. Data compiled by states indicates, however, that only a
very small percentage of the gainfully employed are affected by a rise in the %age rate to
30 cents an hour. See Two YEARS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDArs Acr (Bur. of Lab.
Statistics Ser. No. R-1177, U. S. Dep't Labor 1940) Table 1. For other data with
respect to the effective coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Second Year of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (1939) 49 MONTHLY LAu. Rav. 1439; ANN. REP. WAGE &
HouR Div. 1939 (1940) 34; ANN. REP. VAGE & HOUR Div. 1940 (1941) 81. These
documents point out the industries in which the wage incidence of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act is most significant.
14. Cf. Joint Hearings before Connmitees on Education and Labor on S. 2475 and
H. R. 7200, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 623, 736, 871-72, 988, 1005, 1076. Some em-
ployers argued that wage-fixation by administrative action was improper because diffi-
culties in defining industries and industry classifications would result in arbitrary dis-
crimination. Id. at 556, 1213; cf. id. at 649. This argument is cogent (see p. 1156 infra),
but may be answered by pointing out that other methods of wage fixation result in even
greater inequalities (see pp. 1154-55 infra).
15. A number of Southern employers frankly requested a %age differential as a pro-
tective tariff in order to permit "development" of Southern industries. Joint Hearings,
supra note 14, at 439-40, 591, 765. This view obtained limited support from Secretary Per-
kins, who argued in addition, however, that differentials must not be employed in order
to give low wage areas a competitive advantage in markets in which they competed with
high wage areas. See id. at 186. Some employers argued that differentials which would
favor the South were necessary in order to prevent undesirable migration to urban centers
(Id. at 477), to compensate the South for unfair freight differentials (Id. at 1072), or to
compensate the South for lower living costs. Id. at 591. It was also argued that differ-
entials would do no harm unless they were sufficient to induce migration. Id. at 129. A
Northern manufacturer whose plant was located in a small Pennsylvania town argued for
exemptions or differentials in favor of towns of less than 2,500 on the ground that indus-
tries located in such communities were unable to attract skilled laborers, and that they
were consequently unable to increase their efficiency by mechanizing. Id. at 1112.
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employers, most labor leaders and Negro pressure groups, on the other
hand, opposed differentials.16 Some representatives of both high and
low wage interests indicated the belief that an administrative agency
should be given unlimited discretion to deal with the differential prob-
lem. 7 Others believed that differentials should be established on the
basis of defined criteria.' 8 After termination of the joint hearings on
July 8, 1937, a bill was reported similar in all important respects to the
final version of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Official comment upon the
bill revealed acute consciousness of the diversities in purpose which might
be served by provisions conferring upon the administrative agency the
power to establish differentials. 9 Although the view most commonly
16. Employers: Some employers flatly opposed differentials. Joint Hearings, supra
note 14, at 92, 372. Some employers who urged establishment of a flat minimum did so
because they opposed differentials. Id. at 556-58, 562, 959. For interests urging establish-
ment of a flat minimum for other reasons, see note 29 infra. One employer argued that an
individual should be granted a differential only "if he can prove to the satisfaction of
the Board, and it makes a finding to that effect, that the differential will not result in a
lower labor or other cost per unit of product." Id. at 456, 459; cf. id. at 467. Another
argued that possession of the power to establish differentials would subject the admin-
istrative agency to political pressure, and that the power should consequently be with-
held. Id. at 508, 509. It was also maintained that the differential power should be with-
held because it might be used to give one employer an advantage over another in a given
market. Ibid.
Unions: Some labor leaders flatly opposed differentials based on geography. Id. at
272, 427, 428. Other labor leaders asserted that the power to establish differentials might
be used with circumspection to recognize existing gradients, some of which were not
geographic. Id. at 155, 945, 949.
Negro organizations: "The next type of differential adopted in N.R.A. codes was
that of the geographic differential. The fallacious reasoning was that it cost less to live
in the South. But an examination of N.R.A. codes reveals the blunt fact that this differ-
ential was used primarily to deny benefits of minimum wages to negro workers. First
of all the dividing line between North and South varied from code to code depending on
the geographical location of the industry and the number of negro workers employed in
any particular area." Id. at 572; see also id. at 864-65. One Southern employer said that
the South needed favorable wage differentials because of the "Negro problem." Id. at
1072-73.
17. Employers: Id. at 612, 616 (differentials on real wage lines between North and
South and between large cities and small towns advocated; also usefulness of the differ-
ential as a method of national planning stressed). Employees: Id. at 220, 266.
18. It was urged that differentials should be permitted, if at all, upon the basis of sta-
tistical indices readjusted periodically, (id. at 812-13), and that administrative discretion
should be limited by a provision that no differentials should be granted which would more
than equalize the ratios in low and high wage areas of labor cost to total value of output.
Id. at 1214-15.
19. Senator Vandenberg pointed out the ambiguity of the provisions conferring the
power to establish differentials. He attributed the ambiguity to differences among Ad-
ministration leaders. 81 CONG. RE 7724 (1937). Committee reports state the purpose
of the differential provisions in question-begging language. See SEN. R P. No. 884, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 7; H. R. REP. No. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 9. At a
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taken in debate was that the provisions with respect to differentials would
be used to preserve existing competitive advantages, there was no con-
sensus with respect to the groups which might be deemed to have com-
petitive advantages.2" "Cotton Ed" Smith assumed that the differential
provisions would be utilized to remove the competitive advantages of
the South. 1 Another group felt that wage differentials were temporarily
advisable to compensate areas which were at an "unfair" competitive
advantage notably because of the existing freight rate structure, but
that with removal of "unfair" competitive disadvantages, wage dif-
ferentials might also be removed.22 A variant of this view may have
been the position that differentials were to be employed merely to ease
the shock of transition in areas in which transition to higher rates would
be particularly difficult.' Warnings of the conflict in views as to
the purposes of the differential provisions were voiced to no avail prior
to vote upon the bill which became the Fair Labor Standards Act. -4
later time Representative Dies accused the proponents of the measure of dishonesty in
maintaining concurrently that Southern industry would not be hurt because of the per-
missible differentials and that the bill would stop the trend of industrial migration from
the North to the South. 82 CONG. REc. 1387 (1937).
20. It was pointed out by Representative Taylor of Tennessee that the bill would not
result in removal of the competitive advantages of the South. 81 Coxc. RFc. 9506 (1937).
The opposite complaint was made by Representative Griswold of Indiana who argued
that a similar measure would not remove the competitive disadvantages of the North.
See 82 CoNG. RC 1397 (1937). See also id. at 1404, 1506-07, 1601-21, 1677 (1937).
Cf. testimony of Robert H. Jackson, Joint Hearings, mpra note 14, at 40: "The differ-
ential which the Board would embody in an order is not a differential which already
exists, but which it recognizes because the Board is required to find the value of the
services at the point which is under consideration . . . So that if you have in mind
the possibility of differentials being established for purposes of sliding industry from one
community to another, that is not what the Board is authorized to do."
21. 81 CoNG. Ruc. 7882 (1937).
22. See speech of Senator Black, id. at 7651: "... there might be conditions under
which, in order to get to a market, one particular business would be required to pay
from two to three times as much freight transportation as another. The board, in my
judgment, would be compelled to take that into consideration until the matter was ad-
justed. There might be conditions where general expenses of operation such as the inter-
est rate .... would require that that be taken into consideration in order to reach a fair
conclusion." See also id. at 7654; AUERBACH, LEGisLATht Hisrony OF THE INDU sv
ComTroitEr PRovisio.s OF THE FAIn LABoa STAND.mDs Acr (Wage & Hour Div. 1939)
9; remarks of Representative Ramspeck, Joint Hcarings, supra note 14, at 206.
23. See colloquy between Senator Walsh and Secretary Perkins. Id. at 202.
24. The conference committee attempted to allay all fears by stating that "the dif-
ferences that will exist between the wage rates applicable in each classification must be
justified by facts and not geography." 83 CoNG. Rzc. 9256-57 (1937); see also id. at
9264. It was still thought, however, that ". . . there is nothing that is absolutely def-
inite as to wages and hours" (id. at 9266), and that differentials wiuld be used to penalize
efficiency. Id. at 9258.
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In viewing these obvious contradictions, the Supreme Court, in its
decision that the industry committee provisions constituted a proper dele-
gation of legislative power, has implied that it is appropriate to delegate
power to choose from among what Congressional expression has ex-
plicitly recognized to be conflicting rules of policy. Exercise of admin-
istrative discretion will, however, be subject to the check that findings
must be supported by "substantial evidence." 2' The Opp case indicates
that the "substantial evidence" rule may not be invoked in all cases in
order to reverse determinations supported by evidence of little probative
value. For example, the findings that differences in living and miscel-
laneous costs did not warrant differentials in textile industry wage rates
were supported by only the most flimsy evidence. In concluding that
the findings on these questions were supported by substantial evidence,
the Administrator ruled in effect that the Wage and Hour Division might
decide, purely as a matter of policy, that differentials based upon dif-
ferences in living and miscellaneous production costs were unwarranted."
This does not mean, however, that the substantial evidence test may not
be used to overthrow an administrative determination of policy which
is clearly and unreasonably discriminatory.
Procedure and Composition of Wage-Fixing Agency.
It may also be inferred from the Opp decision that Congress has power
to confer upon a wage-fixing agency virtually boundless authority to
mould its own composition and procedure. Judicial action will check
Congressional or administrative discretion only if the composition or
procedure of the agency established is inherently unfair.
The breadth of permissible delegation appears most clearly from Mr.
Justice Stone's treatment of the vague statutory provisions delimiting
the respective functions of Administrator and industry committee in
performing the important task of defining industries. Under the statu-
tory scheme the power to define industries must be exercised in the first
instance by the Wage and Hour Administrator as a power implied from
his duty to appoint industry committees. The power to sub-delegate to
industry committees the function of defining industries, on the other hand,
may be implied from the Administrator's power to regulate the proce-
25. Opp Cotton Mills v. Wage & Hour Adm'r, 61 Sup, Ct. 524 (U. S. 1941).
26. The Administrator's determination that differences in the cost of living did not
require differentials was based upon little evidence. See p. 1169 infra. Yet such a hold-
ing might have been based upon a number of policy considerations: e.g., that differences
in cost of living were insignificant (see note 108 infra). or that such differences would
have been invoked to prejudice negro workers (see note 16 supra).
27. At the present time, it is impossible to indicate whether clear proof of any dis-
crimination will constitute a proper basis for judicial reversal, or whether clear proof of
discrimination will constitute a basis for judicial reversal only if the discrimination is
shown to be wanton and malevolent. The issue is raised sharply in the pending actions to
review the Railroad and Wool industry wage orders. See discussion pp. 1154-56 inira.
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dure of industry committees. Perhaps, however, industry committees
may be obliged on their own motion to re-examine industry definitions
as an incident to their duty to define classifications within industries.
This ambiguity in describing relative functions of Administrator and
industry committee is attributable only in part to legislative desire to give
the administrative agency power adequate to handle all emergencies. A
more plausible explanation is that ambiguous description was necessary
if the legislative plan was to survive the division of opinion between
New Dealers, like Senator Black, who wished to entrust all effective
power to federal administrators2 and employers who sought to attack
the legislation obliquely by urging that wage fixation should be confided
to the persons interested.29
In the Textile case, the Administrator construed the Act as permitting
him to amend certain portions of the definition of the industry in accord
with the recommendations of the textile industry committee and as allow-
ing him to amend another portion of the definition upon his own motion
after the industry committee had convened. Both these procedures were
held proper when the case reached the Supreme Court in the Opp case.
Mr. Justice Stone argued that in the abstract the power to amend is a
useful administrative device permitting the industry definition to be in
issue throughout the wage order proceeding. Clearly, therefore, "no
28. Under the Black-Connery bill, all power to fix wage rates was cunfided to federal
administrative officials. See H. R. 7200, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) §§ 3-5, 14.
29. In spite of the decision in the case of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U. S. 495 (1935), one employer argued that wage-fixing ought to be confided to the
industry itself. Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 155. Other employers maintained that
the administrative agency should be required to appoint industry committees to act in an
advisory capacity. Id. at 611. Those who opposed all minimum wage legislation of course
favored regulation "by the industry." See note 14 supra. Many employers knew that
Congress was committed to some kind of minimum wage legislation, and believed that
it was therefore better tactics to advocate the method of minimum wage legislation which
would have the least practical effect rather than to oppose minimum wage legislation
in toto. A statutory flat minimum would be the method of wage fixation involving the
least practical effect since a statutory minimum without differentials must be fixed at a
sufficiently modest level to avoid drastic effect upon employment in any industry. See,
e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 437 et seq. (One southern employer advocated both
a flat minimuni and wage legislation which would give the South the equivalent of a
protective tariff); see id. at 507,515 (another witness wanted a fixed minimum and wished
to confer upon governmental officials the power to reduce annual wages below $1,200 if
they had become $1,200 or more as a consequence of collective bargaining); see id. at
517 (Congress should fix a minimum of about $12 a week, this being low enough to per-
mit development of the backward portions of the United States) ; see id. at 751-52 (a flat
statutory wage is needed because the object of wage legislation should be the removal
of "indecent" wages); see id. at 761-62, 802 (fixation of a minimum wage by a board
opposed; examination by Chairman Black brings out the fact that both the witness and
the association he represented opposed minimum iwage legislation in too); cf. id. at S09,
812-13, 824-25.
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purpose or policy of the Act . . . would be served by precluding such
amendments so long as the report of the committee is based on the
amended definition." 30 In the normal case, therefore, it would seem that
Congress may delegate to an administrative agency unlimited power to
establish wage fixing procedures and to select agents to perform neces-
sary functions.
It would be a mistake to assume, however, that the only check upon
administrative action will be the requirement that it shall not be clearly
contrary to statutory purpose or policy. Language in the Opp case appears
to indicate judicial insistence that elemental standards of fairness must
not be contravened by Congressional or administrative action. Although
Mr. Justice Stone sustained the Administrator's selection of an industry
committee as proper, he was careful to indicate by dictum that the
selection of an industry committee might be an "abuse of discretion." '
The statement is particularly striking because the statute fails to indicate
any limitation upon administrative discretion other than the tautological
requirement that "due regard" be given to geographical regions in which
the industry is carried on.
The evident desire of the Court to preserve a residual check upon the
fairness of administrative precedure is also evidenced by its treatment
of petitioner's contention that he had been deprived of adequate notice
and hearing under the doctrine of Morgan v. United States."2 Although
the argument was urged on the Court that the proceeding was analogous to
legislation, and that, therefore, neither notice nor hearing was necessary,
Mr. Justice Stone preferred to sustain the procedures employed on the
more narrow ground that they were essentially fair in the light of rate-
making precedents. 3 The Opp case thus seems to indicate that while
legislative abdication from narrow fields of regulation is constitutional,
unreasonable discrimination by either Congress or an administrative
agency may occasion subsequent judicial intervention.
EXPERIENCE IN ADMINISTRATION OF INDUSTRY COMMITTEE PROVISIONS
The extended sphere of administrative discretion to mould substantive
and procedural standards suggests that it is incorrect to attribute benefits
or shortcomings of the administrative process of wage-fixation employed
under the Fair Labor Standards Act to the legal instrument establishing
the industry committee procedure. Rather, responsibility for adminis-
trative decisions has depended wholly upon the quality of the adminis-
trative personnel, and upon the conditions of political pressure, time,
knowledge and financial ability which have limited the scope of action
30. Opp Cotton Mills v. Wage & Hour Adm'r, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (U. S. 1941).
31. Id. at 534.
32. 298 U. S. 468 (1936).
33. Opp. Cotton Mills v. Wage & Hour Adm'r, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (U. S. 1941).
1150 [Vol. 50: 1141
1941] WAGE AND HOUR INDUSTRY COMMITTEES 1151
of the administrative agency. Experience in administering the industry
committee provisions consequently is of great significance not only
in determining whether the comparatively unimportant task of raising
wages to forty cents an hour has been well done but also as an indication
of the feasibility of any flexible system of wage fixation. Experience
under the industry committee provisions is particularly valuable because
it can be contrasted with the typical consequences of a flat statutory
minimum wage which exists concurrently.
Selection and Delimitation of the "Industry."
The first step in the administration of flexible wage standards under
the industry committee provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
is designation of an industry for which a committee is to be appointed.
Since the statutory mandate indicates no requirements governing the
order in which committees shall be appointed, only considerations of
convenience are important in this connection. Appointment of industry
committees will be considered only for industries which have no great
difficulty in meeting the statutory minimum currently in effect (now
thirty cents). But no committee will be appointed unless a fairly large
body of wage earners in the industry is earning less than the highest
flat minimum (forty cents) provided in the statute.3" The availability
of wage data is a major factor considered in determining whether a
minimum shall be set in a given industry. Since the enforcement of
compliance is a delicate administrative problem of the Wage and Hour
Division, wages will generally be fixed first in occupations in which
they are demanded by unions or trade associations."
But how is the "industry" defined? The Wage and Hour Adminis-
trator has indicated in a number of cases that the primary test is com-
petitive interrelationship36 as determined from data prepared by interested
parties, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the industry committees.37
The adoption of this criterion is essential if employer support of govern-
mental wage fixation is to be elicited. Application of the test results,
however, in difficult problems. It is commonly oversimplification to view
two units as either competitive or non-competitive. Selling markets
generally overlap; firms competing for labor supply may not be rivals
as sellers; raw materials often are embodied in a host of unrelated
products; industries may compete with each other because each com-
petes with a third industry. As a consequence, the Administrator may
34. Axx. REP. WAGE & Houa Div. 1939 (1940) 74.
35. ATr'y GE's Com. oN ADm-m. Paoc.: THE FAro LAEOR STADAzn Acr or
1938 (1939) 13.
36. This test was first enunciated in Report, Textile Industry Committee, Wage &
Hour Release No. R-304, May 23, 1939, at 14-15.
37. Textile Industry, Wage & Hour Release No. R-422a, Sept. 29, 1939, at 7.
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generally define an industry, its-branches, and classifications in a variety
of ways which will give reasonable emphasis to competitive factors.
In most cases, therefore, the Administrator may choose either to define
an industry broadly to include many groups interconnected by competitive
interrelationship (although not necessarily competing as sellers),88 or
he may choose to define an industry narrowly to include only producers
whose activities are closely related. The alternative selected- is in most
cases of little importance since the Administrator considers the same
factors in defining classifications of a large industry and in defining
industries narrowly.3" Different rates are frequently regarded as appro-
priate for different articles because the articles are sold in different
markets." A variety of other differentiating factors may also be of
importance. Goods may embody different raw materials or result from
different processes; they may be produced in different plants or seasons,
or by different grades of labor. They may be regarded as the products
of different classifications or industries solely because statisticians, federal
administrators, labor unions, or trade associations have in the past re-
garded them as the products of distinct occupations. 4 '
In practice, however, it is not wholly immaterial whether the Admin-
istrator defines industries broadly or narrowly. Certain advantages ensue
from broad definition of industries. Duplication of fact-gathering by
successive committees may be avoided. 2 Moreover, a committee for a
38. Broad definitions of industries are favored. See ANN. REP. WAGE & HOUR Div.
1939 (1940) 75. A branch of a large industry may be redefined and treated as a separate
industry when the Administrator rejects the wage recommendations for the branch while
accepting other wage recommendations made by the committee for the large industry.
See circumstances preceding appointment of a committee for the Embroideries Industry,
(Apparel Industry, Wage & Hour Release No. G-39, May 17, 1940, at 357). In some
cases the Administrator has acceded to the request of an industry committee that its jur-
isdiction be reduced, (See Knitted Outerwear Industry, Wage & Hour Release No.
G-50, June 12, 1940, at 7) or enlarged (See Jewelry Industry, 3 Wage & Hour Rep. 531
(1941)).
39. Classification that fails to rest upon any difference is held arbitrary by the Ad-
ministrator. Apparel Industry, supra note 38, at 357.
40. Id. at 7-9.
41. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 12, 14, 15; Woolen Industry, Wage & Hour
Release No. G-35, May 15, 1940, at 25-26; Hosiery Industry, Wage & Hour Release No.
R-378, August 18, 1939, at 29-32; Hat Industry, Wage & Hour Release No. G-36, May
15, 1940, at 6-7; Knitted Outerwear Industry, supra note 38, at 6; Apparel Industry,
supra note-'38, at 24, 44-51, 93-95, 103, 110-11, 113, 124-25, 128, 224. Cf. id. at 27-31.
"Infants' and children's outerwear" was treated as a single branch in part because the
classification was a unit for publicity purposes. Id. at 233. That articles are distinguish-
able in appearance and durability offers some justification for placing them in different
branches. See id. at 253-54. Historical differences considered include groupings for sta-
tistical purposes under N.R.A., by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and by the Bureau of
the Census. ANN. REP. WAGE & HOUR Div. 1940 (1941) 111.
42. See Apparel Industry, supra note 38, at 10.
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large industry may consider the broader competitive relationships which
might escape an industry committee whose activities were more limited.
Broad definition of industries also results in rapid extension of coverage,
which, however, is not an unmixed advantage unless based upon adequate
factual analysis. On the other hand, the "large industry" method may
possibly be disadvantageous because it normally results in recommenda-
tion of numerous rates by a single committee. Consequently, adherence to
the "large industry" method would result in considerable wasted effort,
should it be held that the Administrator cannot reverse in part and affirm
in part recommendations made by a single industry committee. 5 .\
practical disadvantage is that industry committees must be of limited
size to be workable44 and that therefore the composition of a committee
for a comprehensive industry can seldom reflect with even a fair degree
of accuracy the different groups subject to the jurisdiction of the com-
mittee.45 Furthermore, if groups have not been given adequate repre-
sentation, they may not cooperate in enforcing wage orders.40 The
advantages to be attained by the broad method of definition may, more-
over, be secured to a considerable extent by the device of appointing
in rapid succession committees for related industries4 or by giving com-
mittees for different related industries interlocking personnel. 8
The problems under either method of definition are identical. In the
first place, units within which wages are fixed must be designated in
such a manner as to avoid unnecessary hardship to particular competi-
tors. Because there is generally no sharp dichotomy between "being in
competition" and "not being in competition", delimitation of industries
and classifications will generally result in borderline cases of discrim-
ination. This hardship is aggravated in plants containing machinery
which can be employed readily either to produce products subject to
the jurisdiction of one wage order or to produce products subject to
the jurisdiction of another wage order. The Administrator has adopted
the view that a plant will be included in the X industry if its machinery
43. The problem arises out of the ambiguity of 52 STAT. 1064 (1936), 29 U. S. C.
§ 208 (Supp. 1939). See discussion note 57 infra.
44. ArN. REP. WAGE & HOUR Div. 1939 (1940) 77.
45. See note 84 infra.
46. The Wage and Hour Division is frequently confronted with demands for narrow
industry definitions. See AxN. REP. WAGE & Hotn Div. 1940 (1941) 111. For the ne-
cessity of cooperating with private interests in order to secure adequate compliance, see
note 137 infra.
47. Note, for example, the rapid successive appointment of committees for the textile,
apparel, wool, hosiery, knitted outerwear, kmitted underwear, embroidery, and carpet and
rug industries; of committees for leather and luggage industries; and of committees for
the pulp and paper, and converted paper products industries.
48. E.g., duplication of personnel of apparel, textile, and knit garment committees.
2 WAGE & Hour REP. 421 (1939).
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might be employed to produce products of the X industry.40 What,
however, if the plant is actually producing Y? Is the plant also in the
Y industry? And shall the X or Y rate be applicable? Adoption of the
view that the plant must pay the higher of the two rates will result in
placing the plant at a competitive disadvantage. If, on the other hand,
the plant may pay the rate appropriate for the article currently being
produced, it will be in a position to evade the statutory mandate because
of the administrative difficult; of determining the minimum which should
have been paid in a past period. Another frequent problem of com-
petitive inequality arises because of the existence of integrated plants
which perform operations both in the X and in the Y industries. It has
been argued with some persuasiveness that institution of a wage order
in the X industry will bring all of the employees of such a plant under
the X rate, inasmuch as it is impractical for the plant to pay different
rates to employees who work side by side in identical or virtually identical
occupations.50 Two proposed solutions are applicable both to the situ-
ation of the plant employing machinery useful in two or more industries
and to the problem of the integrated plant: the Y industry may be included
in the X industry"' or identical wage rates may be promulgated for the
X and Y industries. Frequently, the former of these two alternatives
will be unsatisfactory to members of the Y industry since as a corollary
of inclusion of the Y industry in the X industry, it may happen that
the Y industry must be denied majority or even all representation on
the industry committee for the X-Y industry. If on the other hand,
separate industry committees are appointed for the X and Y industries,
it will be pure coincidence if the X and Y wage rates are identical.
Since industry definition must thus almost inevitably result in arbitrary
discrimination, it might be thought that the attempt to define industries
should be abandoned. Industry definition is, however, a necessary result
of any system of controlling wages. Every negotiation of a collective
agreement and every definition of an appropriate bargaining unit neces-
sitate resolution of the problems of industry definition. The practical
49. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 7.
50. Cf. Minority Report, Paper Industry Committee, 3 WAGE & HouR RE,. 178-79
(1940). Apparel Industry, supra note 39, at 108, 220, 360-66. In reply to this contention,
the Wage and Hour Division generally argues that employees may be segregated, and
that even employees who are not segregated can feasibly be paid different rates. Ibid. In
the slightly different situation in which a given employee is employed in the same work
week producing articles for which there are different minima, it is now rebuttably pre-
sumed that the employee should have been paid the highest applicable rate throughout the
week. 3 WAGE & HoUR REr. 335 (1940), overruling 3 WAGE & HouR REP. 210 (1940).
This rule may cause employers to record the different kinds of work performed by an
employee within a given week. The more likely effect will be to terminate the practice
of using employees in different work in one work week.
51. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 11-12, 15; Hosiery Industry, supra note 41,
at 11.
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issue, then, is not to choose between a system under which industries
are defined by the Wage and Hour Division and a system under which
there is no delimitation of industries; it is more important to compare
the merits of the Wage and Hour Division method of determining the
wage-fixing unit with the merits of delimitation by other forces.
In view of the complexities of competitive interrelationship, it is prob-
ably improper to anticipate that any method of defining the wage fixing
unit can avoid unfair treatment of some employers. If the procedures
employed in defining industries are carefully worked out and if the
definitions achieved have not resulted in overlapping of the jurisdiction
of different wage orders, the process of industry definition probably
achieves all that can be expected. Judged from this point of view, industry
delimitation by the Wage and Hour Division has been adequately suc-
cessful. In the first place, the procedure of industry definition has been
planned with considerable care. The initial step is preparation of a study
of the wage structure of a particular industry. This study is conducted
by the Industry Committee Branch and the Research and Economics
Branch of the Wage and Hour Division whose staffs consult members
of the industry, trade journals and statistical sources and conduct a field
investigation. In nearly all cases the Industry Committee Branch and
the Research and Economic Branch ultimately agree with each other
and with the substantial interests affected. After a tentative definition is
approved by the Legal Branch, it is submitted to the Wage and Hour
Administrator, who has invariably sustained the findings of his subor-
dinates. The definition of the industry thus suggested is in issue in
subsequent proceedings before the industry committee and again at the
hearings before the Administrator. In the only case to date where the
definition of the industry has been seriously disputed in the hearing before
the Administrator, the industry committee unanimously disapproved the
industry definition although it approved the wage recommendation.r0
Usually, however, despite individual objections, the definitions originally
established by the Administrator have been approved.
As a consequence of the care with which industries have been de-
limited, there is no reported instance in which industry definition has
caused jurisdictional disputes. 4 The few instances of dissatisfaction with
52. Arr'xy G x's Con., supra note 35, at 14-17.
53. The committee which rejected the definition wvas the wool industry committee.
The definition had been accepted by the textile industry committee. See further note 55
infra.
54. Avoidance of jurisdictional disputes is in considerable measure the result of ade-
quate factual analysis. A number of procedures that have been employed have also proved
useful: (a) The scope of an exception from an industry definition is defined not by the
committee for the industry, but by the committee, established subsequently, for the clas-
sification excepted. Apparel Industry, supra note 38. at 12. This device may be employed
only if no substantial amount of time intervenes between establishment of the committee
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industry definitions have been a product of the circumstance, already
pointed out, that industry delimitation must generally result in placing
some competitors at a competitive disadvantage. But it is submitted
that if an individual definition or classification can be justified as an
effort to advance the public interest, it should be sustained even though
it may cause injury to a definable group." For it is obvious that any
for the industry and establishment of a committee for the classification excepted. Am-
biguity in the first wage order must be clarified promptly if jurisdictional difficulties are
to be avoided. (b) By virtue of his power to interpret industry definitions, the Adminis-
trator may plug a loophole in an industry definition long after the committee for the
industry has become inactive. Cl". 3 WAGE & HOUR REP. 489 (1940) ; General Counsel's
Interpretation of the Apparel Minimum Wage Order, Wage & Hour Release No. G-43
(rev.), May 24, 1940.
For examples of the extreme care employed in definition in order to avoid jurisdic-
tional disputes, see Apparel Industry, supra note 38, at 25-26, 44-58. Compare jurisdic-
tional difficulties arising from the administration of the National Industrial Recovery
Act. See TROWBRIDGE, SoME AsPECTs OF THE WOMEN's APPAREL INDUSTRY (N.R.A.
Div. of Review, Work Materials No. 44, 1936); N.R.A., HISTORY OF TIlE CODE OF FAIR
COMPETITION FOR THE COAT AND SUIT INDUSTRY (1936) Appendix at 168-69; N.R.A.,
HISTORY OF THE CODE OF FAIR COAIPETITION FOR THE BLOUSE AND SUIT INDUSTRY
(1936) 39.
55. The definitions of three industries have been deemed objectionable by interests
adversely affected by wage orders. The National Association of Wool Manufacturers re-
cently filed a petition contesting the validity of the woolen minimum wage order of 36
cents. 4 WAGE & HOUR REP. 179 (1941). The petitioners pointed out that as a conse-
quence of the definitions of the textile and of the woolen industries, mixed yarns could
be produced on the cotton textile system by employees who were paid 325/2 cents an hour
whereas employees who produced identical fabrics by the woolen system of production
were to be paid not less than 36 cents an hour. The woolen industry committee, it was
pointed out, had refused to accept those portions of the definition of the industry which
had given cotton textile establishments extensive jurisdiction over mixed yarns. See
Report, Woolen Industry Committee, Wage and Hour Release No. R-550, January 4,
1940. The petitioners claimed further that the differential had caused considerable cur-
tailment of employment in woolen mills by shifting production of mixed yarns to textile
establishments. After the wool manufacturers filed their petition, a newly appointed
committee for the textile industry unanimously voted to raise the textile minimum to
37Y2 cents an hour. 4 WAGE & Houa RE,. 194 (1941). If the recommendations of the
new textile committee are approved by the Wage and Hour Administrator, the wool
manufacturers' case will become moot. It is possible that particular textile establish-
ments will then be harmed by the differential in favor of the woolen industry. Cl. 4
WAGE & HOUR REr. 127 (1941) (action to set aside Apparel wage) ; 4 WAGE & HOUR
RP. 71 (1941).
An issue analogous to the issue in the Woolen case is presented by the petition to
review the railroad wage order which has been filed by certain Southern railroad con-
panies. 4 WAGE & HOUR REP. 162 (1941). The petitioning short line companies contend
inter alia that the Administrator abused his discretion when he appointed a separate
industry committee for the railroads. The proper course, it is alleged, would have been
to appoint an industry committee for the entire transportation industry. In treating this
issue, the Railroad Industry Committee has remarked: "While the Act charges the
Committee with the duty of having due regard to competitive conditions in reaching its
findings, it is not the duty of this committee to equalize competitive relations between
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attempt to define the unit in which wages are fixed, whether it be by
public regulation or private action, will result in a degree of arbitrary
discrimination against particular interests.
It has been suggested, however, that the process of defining industries
might be improved by acquainting industry committees more thoroughly
with the results of statistical analysis.r" It is also said that the Admin-
istrator should be given express power to reject the definition of an
industry in a wage order without rejecting the entire order; otherwise,
there is strong practical pressure for the Administrator to approve a
wage order in toto. 7 But these considerations are in any event minor,
and the procedures followed seem justified by the general satisfaction
with the determinations made to date.
Selection of Industry Committee Members.
After an industry has been tentatively defined, the Administrator must
select employer, employee, and public members of the industry committee.
In naming the employee representatives the principal problems have been
to give due weight to the strength of different unions and proper repre-
sentation to non-union labor. Attempt has been made to distribute
committee positions among rival unions in proportion to their relative
strengths.58 Any failure to achieve proportional representation has been
of little significance since representatives of different unions have always
agreed on the wage determinations which should be adopted. A more
serious difficulty arises from the Administrator's ruling that union offi-
cials are proper representatives of unorganized labor because they have
sworn to maintain the interests of all classes of labor. By failing to
secure participation of unorganized labor on industry committees, the
Wage and Hour Administrator has established a procedure which is
potentially unfair. In the Opp case it was frequently contended and
never denied that the great bulk of southern textile labor was non-union
railroads and motor and water carriers. The competition of motor and water carriers
is only relevant in so far as it reduces the railroads to so desperate a financial condition
that the extra cost resulting from the establishment of a thirty-cent minimum wage will
result in discharges and abandonments." Report, Railroad Industry Committee, Wage &
Hour Release No. G-64, August 14, 1940, at 44-45.
56. A'r'Y GE's Comi., supra note 35, at 13-17.
57. It is possible that the Administrator has the power to reverse a wage order in
part. Id. at 18-20. The power to reject wage recommendations for some branches of
the industry while accepting wage recommendations for other branches has been exer-
cised at least twice. Puerto Rico Needlework Industry, Wage & Hour Release No.
G-105, November 15, 1940, at 9-10; Apparel Industry, supra note 39, at 357. But there
has been no case in which the Administrator has accepted a %rage order while rejecting
the industry definition upon which it is based. The Administrator will probably be deemed
to lack such power. See Opp Cotton Mills v. Wage & Hour Adm'r, (A Sup. Ct. 524, 534
(U. S. 1941) (wage recommendations must be based on the industry definitiun adopted).
58. Cf. ATT'y GExs Coini., mpra note 35, at 23.
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and that many southern textile workers earn much more than they would
earn in any other employment. Southern labor hence might have a
stake in the preservation of a Southern low wage industry. Yet Southern
labor was represented on the textile industry committee by union offi-
cials most of whose constituents resided in the North, and Northern labor
would like nothing better than to protect northern manufacturers and
northern wage standards by eliminating the competition of wage cutting
southern employers. It is thus potentially harmful to the interests of
the unorganized to permit union officials to represent non-union labor.
Adoption of this method of representation has been justified by the
Administrator on the ground that a non-union laborer represents only
himself or his employer."0 The Administrator's argument fails to sup-
port his conclusion if it is possible to give representation to the interests
of unorganized labor without causing employer domination of the repre-
sentatives of unorganized labor.
60
In selecting employer representatives, the practice has been to obtain
nominations from trade associations.61 From the nominations thus
received, the Administrator attempts to select persons who will repre-
sent the more important wage interest, product, and geographical
branches of the industry.62 This seems to be subject to the same objec-
tion as the parallel practice of determining employee representatives by
consulting unions. In the present state of industrial organization, how-
ever, no other course seems practical.
It is of peculiar importance that public representatives be selected with
care since they normally hold the balance of power upon the question
of whether or not a given minimum shall be enacted. In selecting public
representatives, the Administrator commonly consults the National Con-
sumers' League.63 In the Hosiery case, public representatives were selected
59. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 20; Woolen Industry, supra note 41, at 6;
A T'y GEN's Comm., supra note 35, at 25. Bureau of Labor Statistics data has been em-
ployed in compiling the relative strength of unions. The Bureau of Labor Statistics data
was obtained, however, by consulting union records. The A. F. of L. has claimed that
the C.I.O. records are inaccurate, and the C.I.O. has claimed that the A. F. of L. records
are inaccurate.
60. See pp. 1178-79 infra.
61. AT'Y Gm's Comm., supra note 35, at 25-26.
62. ANN. REP. WAGE & HoUR Div. 1939 (1940) 76; Hosiery Industry, supra note
41, at 102. In some instances the necessity of defining industries broadly has prevented
the Administrator from giving representation to important product interests. See Ap-
parel Industry, supra note 38, at 236 (infants' and children's wear unrepresented on com-
mittee), 155 (men's and boys' underwear of woven fabric unrepresented on committee).
The Administrator defended the exclusions on the ground that "There are common ele-
ments in the manufacture and distribution of the apparel products which qualify each
employer on the committee to represent all of the industries covered by the committee."
Id. at 236.
63. A-rr'y GEN'S COmm.. supra note 35, at 26.
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from the joint recommendations of employers and employees." In order
to serve as a public representative on a committee for a given industry,
it is desirable but not essential that a person be qualified by prior ex-
perience with problems of the industry."5 Criteria which have guided
the Administrator in naming public representatives are suggested by
the occupations of the selectees. A very large number have been either
professors at institutions of higher learning,0 newspaper and magazine
editors,"7 or agents of large consumers of products of the industry."3
A few have been impartial arbiters for the same or related industries."2
Nearly all remaining public members are representatives of consumers
organizations,"0 lawyers, 71 social workers,7' members of institutions of
economic research,73 state governmental officials,7" judges7 5 engineers,70
or clergymen.
77
Complaints in connection with the organization of the industry com-
mittees have generally been made on the ground that the committees do
not give "due" representation to geographical areas in wlich industry
64. AxN. REP. WVAGE & Houn Div. 1940 (1941) 109.
65. Compare Record, Opp Cotton Mills v. Wage & Hour Adm'r, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (U.
S. 1941) [hereinafter cited as Record] (pointing out that many members of the first
Textile Industry Committee had little knowledge of the problems of the industry) with
ANr. REP. WVAGE & Hour Drv. 1939 (1940) 76 (asserting that "Every effort is made to
secure public members who are not only disinterested in the sense that they have no per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the committee's deliberations, but who also are in a position
to contribute positively to the work of the committee. The character, background, and
experience of a person and his ability to act intelligently on the problems of his commit-
tee are among the factors taken into account in the selection of public members").
66. Textiles (1939); Wool; Leather; Pants; Hosiery (1939); Hats; Apparel; Mil-
linery; Shoes; Textiles (1941); Knitted Outerware; Knitted Underwear; Clay Pro-
ducts; Enameled Utensils; Portable Lamp and Shade; Embroidery; Converted Paper
Products; Luggage; Carpet and Rugs; Pulp and Paper; Leather; Seamless Hosiery
(1941); Rubber; Drugs; Gray Iron.
67. Textiles (1939); Hosiery; Shoes; Knitted Outerwear; Knitted Underwear;
Pants; Textiles (1941); Apparel.
68. Textiles (1939); Wool; Hats; Shoes (representative was a member of Farm
Bureau; Farm Bureau represents farmers as purveyors of raw materials as well as farm-
ers as consumers); Knitted Outerwear; Knitted Underwear; Leather; Luggage; Tex-
tiles (1941); Millinery; Apparel.
69. Textiles (1939); Hosiery; Jewelry; Carpets and Rugs.
70. Leather; Embroidery.
71. Shoes; Leather; Clay Products.
72. Textiles (1939); Hats; Millinery; Apparel.
73. Hosiery.
74. Knitted Outerwear; Apparel; Jewelry; Leather.
75. Hats; Puerto Rico; Knitted Underwear; Apparel; Pulp and Paper; Millinery.
76. Pulp and Paper; Apparel.
77. Shoes; Gray Iron. Of the first 94 public representatives appointed, 38 vere
educators, 17 business executives, 8 lawyers, 6 newspaper executives, 4 representatives
of industrial organizations, 3 representatives of consumers organizations, 3 social work-
ers, 3 judges, and 2 engineers. ANN. RE:P. WAGE & HouR Div. 1940 (1941) 109.
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is carried on. The Administrator has followed the lower court opinion
in the Opp case in declaring that it is unreasonable to demand that
there be exact mathematical representation of all interests.71 Exact
representation, it is said, is impractical, for this would result in com-
mittees of unwieldy size.70 Officers of the national trade associations
and unions,80 moreover, purport to represent "all" areas!"
But even if mathematical precision is not feasible, the Administrator
might nevertheless make explicit the criteria which he employs in deter-
mining what is "due" representation for various geographical areas.8 2
The outstanding opinions of the Wage and Hour Administrators, how-
ever, do not indicate preference for one or another criterion or for
any number of criteria in combination." Silence with respect to methods
of selection may not be unwise tactically since argument on the issue
would generally reveal only that the Administrator could have readily
reached different conclusions and since any attempted explanation would
probably be offensive to particular interests.8 4 Characteristic difficulties
in effecting proper geographical representation are pointed out by the
record in the Textile industry case. The record indicates that 31 per cent of
American textile establishments are located in the South, that the South
contributes 51.5 per cent of the production of American textiles by
value and that the South employs 55 per cent of American textile
workers.8" The cotton textile branch was the only branch of the textile
industry which in 1939 experienced serious difficulty in meeting a thirty-
two and one-half cent minimum. In this branch the position of the South
was even more dominant. Employing 73 per cent of the American
workers engaged in manufacturing cotton textiles in 59.9 per cent of
the whole number of American establishments, the South produced 70
78. Opp Cotton Mills v. Wage & Hour Adm'r, 111 F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940),
aff'd, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (U. S. 1941) ; Woolen Industry, supra note 41, at 4.
79. Id. at 6.
80. Hat Industry, supra note 41, at 11.
81. There has appeared no statistical evidence establishing this "fact".
82. Some possible criteria are total population, number of employers, number of
employees, amount of industrial production.
83. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 18-22.
84. Because of the necessarily restricted size of the first textile committee, the
Southwest received five times its proportional representation (calculated upon the basis
of percentage of the national production) although it had only one member on the com-
mittee. One of the manufacturers included on the hosiery committee lives in the North
although his place of business is in the South. The interests of some persons who have
served on industry committees are nation-wide. Public representatives may have similar
viewpoints no matter what their nominal places of residence. The above are illustrative
difficulties in giving "due" regard to geographical regions, even if it can be assumed that
some selection from among the criteria outlined in footnote 82 is feasible. ANN. RZE.
WAGE & HouR Div. 1939 (1940) 77.
85. Id. at 19.
[Vol. SO: 11411160
1941] WAGE AND HOUR INDUSTRY COMMITTEES
per cent of the American value of product." Under these circumstances
the South was awarded four of five employer representatives on the
textile committee, three of five public representatives, and two of five
employee representatives.8 '
This award was not required by the language and legislative history
of the Act. Since the South contributed a majority of the production
of American textiles by value and since the South employed a majority
of American textile workers, the Administrator might well have argued
that the South should have been granted a majority of the members of
each class of persons on the textile industry committee. The Admin-
istrator might have held that it was improper to define the textile industry
to include the predominantly Northern and high wage silk and rayon
industries as well as the predominantly Southern and lower wage cotton
industry if a necessary consequence of defining the textile industry to
include cotton, silk, and rayon was the successful gerrymandering of
the wage interest most likely to be adversely affected by a wage order.
The Administrator might also have decided that industry committee
members should have been nominated with explicit reference to the cotton
textile production or total textile production of each of the several states,
rather than by reference to regions as large as the "North" and the
"South." It may be that none of these alternative arguments would
induce results preferable to those achieved by the Administrator in the
Textile industry case. It is suggested, however, that the important prob-
lem of securing proper industrial representation should not be solved
by ad hoc, unreasoned opinions of the kind handed down by the Wage
and Hour Administrator.
Consideration of the Effect of Minima upon Costs,
Prices and Employment
Although every opinion of the Wage and Hour Administrator pays
lip service to all statutory provisions indicating limitations upon the
power to fix wages by means of the industry committee procedure, the
interpretation which the Wage and Hour Division has placed upon its
power to fix wages can only be determined by examining the issues upon
which the Division has thought it expedient to gather evidence and by
examining the kinds of evidence to which the Division accords weight.
Evidence presented before an industry committee, and subsequently
presented before the Wage and Hour Administrator is of two types:
testimony from personal experience with respect to the need for or the
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id. at 19. But cf. composition of the second textile industry committee, appointed
in 1941. The South was given a majority of public and of employer representatives in-
cluded on this committee. 4 VAGE & Hour REP. 129-30 (1941). Yet the committee
unanimously approved a 37Y cent minimum wage. 4 VAGE & Hout R'. 194 (1941).
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effect of proposed minima, and statistical studies presented either by
governmental agencies (including the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
the Wage and Hour Division) or by private interests which would be
affected by any determination (A. F. of L., C. I. 0., trade associations).
These statistical studies, best proof of the general impact of wage
changes, are especially important in view of the Administrator's ruling
that the Act does not permit consideration of individual instances of
hardship. 8 Moreover, only statistical studies presented by the govern-
ment are of real importance since data from other sources is too frag-
mentary to be of significance.
Statistical studies presented by the Wage and Hour Division for the
consideration of the industry committees and for the consideration
of the Administrator are of three types: (1) those tending to show
the effects of particular wage increases on employment; (2) those dealing
with the cost of living in different localities; (3) those dealing with
freight differentials.
Effect of Wage Increases
Governmental investigation and presentation of data showing the
effects of particular wage increases begins with a field study by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics of prevailing wage rates in the industry and
of the numbers of employees receiving wages at each rate. A large
percentage of the employers in most industries voluntarily submit payroll
data to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This data is brought up to date
by sample questionnaires. In the Shoe Industry case it was said that
"the Bureau of Labor Statistics selected firms on the basis of their
corporate affiliations, size, geographical location, production, unioniza-
tion, and the like. Thus, the sample was selected so that every factor
was represented in the same proportion as it actually appeared in the
total industry."8 9 From the figures thus obtained, the Wage and Hour
Division economic section calculates the percentage increases in the
total wage bill of the industry attributable to the payment of mini-
mum wages set at different levels. The method of figuring these
percentages is "to determine first the percentage of employees who are
88. See pp. 1167-68 infra.
89. Payroll samples employed to date have been checked with data secured from
employers during subsequent periods and have been found accurate. Shoe Industry, Wage
& Hour Release No. G-16, March 23, 1940, at 55-56. In some instances there has been
total disregard of sampling principles. It was deemed proper to fail to sample certain
minor producing areas because wages there were in general high. Millinery Industry,
Wage & Hour Release No. R-535, Dec. 15, 1939, at 37. In the Apparel case no avail-
able study "covered items of sportswear other than heavy jackets, but, since these other
items were shown to be closely identified with heavy jackets [the Administrator con-
cluded] that together the surveys offer a basis for measuring with reasonable accuracy
the wage bill increases which will be caused by a 40 cent minimum in this industry."
Apparel Industry, supra note 39, at 96.
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receiving less than the established minimum and the ratio of their wage
rate to the average wage rate. The percentage wage increase in the wage
rate of this group may then be applied to that proportion of the industry
or plant wage bill which is represented by the payrolls received by the
group in question." 0
It is likewise necessary to take into account changes in wages above
the minima which would result because employers are required to main-
tain wage differentials among various classes of employees. The N.R.A.
experience was once thought to indicate that the enactment of a mini-
mum wage necessitates upward revision of wages already above the
minimum, and that such upward revision increases total wage cost
by from eight to fifteen per cent of the increase in total wage cost
resulting from the raising of all employees to the prescribed minimum
rate."' The Wage and Hour Administrator has realized that use of the
N.R.A. experience to ascertain the probable effect of a minimum
wage rate in stimulating a rise in wages above the minimum involves
a number of dubious assumptions. Moreover, a Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics expert has testified before the Administrator that institution of
a minimum wage may cause as small a percentage change in that part
of the total wage bill attributable to wages which were below the mini-
mum before the wage order as it causes in that part of the total wage
bill attributable to wages which were above the minimum before
the wage order." The Admiristrator has consequently found it neces-
saty to supplement the N. R. A. data by the assertion that since the
Fair Labor Standards Act compels no increase in wage rates above the
minimum, it is unimportant whether or not satisfactory statistical study
can be made of the effect of a minimum wage order upon wages above
the minimum. 3 This assertion fails to take due cognizance of the argu-
90. See Brief, Respondent, Appendix B, at 11, Opp Cotton Mills v. Wage & Hour
Adm'r, 61 Sup. Ct 524 (U. S. 1941) (hereinafter referred to as Appendix B).
91. Id. at 13-14.
92. Testimony of 'Mr. Jacob Perlman, Chief of the Division of Wage and Hour Sta-
tistics of the Department of Labor, In re Recommendation of the Shoe Industry Com-
mittee, Hearings before the Wage & Hour Adm'r (1939) 31; 6 id. at 169-71. See also
testimony of Mr. Ball, 6 id. at 56 et seq. But there was other expert testimony contra;
see testimony of Air. Fallon, 6 id. at 181-83.
93. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 32. It is now pointed out more cautiously
that there are many reasons why it is impossible to calculate with complete accuracy the
effect of minima upon wages above the minima. Because increases above the minimum
may take place over considerable periods of time, their extent may be conditioned by
business conditions considerably different from those experienced at the date of issuance
of the wage order. The extent of increase above the minimum may vary betveen locali-
ties due to differences in the bargaining strength of labor, and differences in the labor
policy of competitors for the available labor supply. No adjustment of vages above the
minimum may be necessary if existing differentials are sufficiently wide. The uncer-
tainty of increases above the minimum may be counteracted somewhat by increases in
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ment that an employer who wishes to avoid labor disputes with his
employees cannot permit fluctuation in the differentials between rates
paid various classes of labor in his employ.
Given the total increases in wage bill resulting from various higher
minima, the next step in calculating the effect of given minima will be
to determine the ratio between labor cost and total cost characteristic
of the industry. This material is likewise obtained from Bureau of Labor
Statistics figures. No discussion has been found of the methods of cost
accounting employed by the Bureau, but the fact that the industry-wide
and sectional ratios employed in making computations have not been
disputed is testimony to their propriety. It is true that they have on
occasion deviated considerably from cost ratios which individual em-
ployers have stated to be characteristic of their own businesses.
Estimate of the effect of proposed wage rates upon labor and total
costs in the industry as a whole is supplemented by a comparable estimate
for each of various classifications within the industry. In the textile
industry, there were five classifications for each of which separate sta-
tistics were compiled. The classifications selected for special study were
the Northern cotton mills, the Northern integrated mills, the Northern
fine goods industries, the Southern integrated mills, and the Southern
spinning mills. The selection of these particular classifications was not
explained by the Wage and Hour Division. Moreover, these classifica-
tions could have been justified only on the assumption that substantial
unemployment in any group of mills smaller than the entire body of
Southern spinning or integrated textile mills was not "substantial cur-
tailment of employment within any classification of the industry" within
the meaning of the legislation. Unless this assumption is made, it cannot
be said that the Administrator supported by substantial evidence his
finding in the Textile case that the proposed wage order would not cause
substantial curtailment of employment within any classification of the
textile industry. 4 In view of the uncertain meaning of the phrase
"substantial curtailment of employment within any classification of the
individual productivity or by the award of learner exemptions and handicapped-worker
permits.
"Some indication of the relative amount of increases above the minimum, in com-
parison with increases to the minimum can perhaps be found in the experience under
NRA. From July to August, 1933, during which period the applicable code became ef-
fective, average hourly earnings in the underwear industry increased about 43.8 per-
cent; between August, 1933 and August, 1934 there were further increases aggregating
14.5 percent. The latter figure might be regarded as the amount of the increases above
the minimum, which would suggest that such increases will amount to only about one-
third of the increases in subminimum wages." Knitted Underwear and Commercial
Knitting Industry, Wage & Hour Release No. G-24, April 11, 1940, at 13-14.
94. See note 11 supra, indicating the lack of clarity of the phrase "substantial cur-
tailment of employment." For administrative interpretation of the clause "substantial
curtailment of employment," see note 125 infra.
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industry," the Administrator should at least have indicated reasons for
adopting the position9' that the wage order was a proper exercise of
administrative discretion, although not based on a statistical survey of
the potential effects of wage increases upon any determinate group of
mills more limited than the entire body of Southern integrated or spin-
ning mills. It may be argued, however, that the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' study, when supplemented by evidence that individual "small"
Southern mills were efficient and that small mills were frequently owned
by large corporations, was sufficiently comprehensive to establish at least
a prima facie case for denying a favorable classification to any number
of mills less than the sum of Southern spinning mills.
But the effect of various proposed minima upon total costs does not
afford complete insight into the immediate economic effects of wage
rises. The impact of increases in total costs upon prices to consumers
must also be considered. As the Wage and Hour Division recognized
in the Textile case, this effect probably cannot be measured with precision.
Increased cost may have little effect upon price and may result primarily
in a gradual transfer of production from the less efficient to the more
efficient mills in the industry. Two other results may also be possible:
(1) an offsetting of the increased labor costs in some mills by manipula-
tion of other cost factors, and (2) an absorption of increased costs out
of profits of some concerns in the chain from manufacturer to whole-
saler or retailer.
The likelihood of one or another of these results depends upon the
extent to which prices to consumers are customarily inflexible,10 upon the
degree of inelasticity of demand for consumers goods, 7 and upon the
95. The Administrator did devote some discussion to the problem of small mills in.the
Textile case. This discussion appears, however, only to have been by vay of rebuttal.
It apparently was not felt that the Committee's finding must be supported by independent
evidence of the condition of small mills. Some attempt %as made to show that small
mills were not a special class because of marketing and purchasing disadvantages, but
that, on the contrary, some were very profitable. Id. at 66-69. Some effort was devoted
to impeachment of Mrs. Mager's report on small mills, compiled for Mississippi employ-
ers. But the assertion in Mir. Emil Rieve's testimony that the Industry Committee spent
most of its time in discussing and analyzing the small or marginal mills does not seem
adequately supported by evidence introduced before the Administrator. Appendix B,
supra note 90, at S. Some doubt upon the procedure adopted is suggested by Perliman,
Extent and Causes of Differences in Hourly Earnings (1940) 35 J. Ams. SrTr. Ass':;
1, 2-3: ". . . there are cases where no industry structure may be said to exist . . .
This kind of an industry often has a relatively small number of establishments, -,,Wich
are scattered widely on a regional basis . . .Under such conditions, the vmge structure
in a given plant is largely the result of competition from establishments of other indus-
tries in the same locality . . ."
96. E.g., Textile Industry, mipra note 37, at 44, 45; Woolen Industry, Mspra note 41,
at 10.
97. E.g., Knitted Outerwear Industry, supra note 38, at 26. See also Hat Industry,
supra note 41, at 25.
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possibility of cheapening the quality of consumers goods without affect-
ing their price." No attempt has been made to measure these factors
by comprehensive statistical study, as it has been deemed unnecessary
or infeasible to do more than record personal experience of the extent
to which these factors were important.
Attempt is made, however, to determine statistically the maximum
effect which given wage rises will have upon prices to consumers. In the
case of a product subject to further processing or to sale to a middleman
befor; retail sale, such determination involves calculation of: (1) the
percentage that the cost of production of the article bears t6 the total
cost of various consumers goods which it embodies, and (2) whether
markups in the course of further conversion of the article have been
changed because of change in its manufacturing cost." The result will
be a schedule indicating quantitatively the maximum effect of various
minima in producing percentage increases in prices of various consumers
goods. The value of this schedule has been limited somewhat by failure
to show which consumers goods absorb the largest percentages of the
production of the article whose wage-cost has been increased.
In addition to wage, cost and price data, the government also informs
the industry committee of existing trends in industrial production and
employment. 00 Thereupon the industry committee draws conclusions
98. See, e.g., Report, Textile Industry Committee, supra note 36, at 27.
99. Appendix B, .mpra note 90, at 26-42.
100. From the Textile Industry Record:
(a) it appears that there was some pretence of considering data with respect to the
effect of the proposed minimum in augmenting unemployment by stimulating disastrous
foreign competition at new price levels. The data considered took into account past trends
in the consumption of domestic and foreign textile products. As past trends showed that
domestic producers were able on previous occasions to survive cost increases, the Admin-
istrator inferred without reference to past or present profit margins that domestic pro-
ducers would be able to survive in the future cost increases resulting from the newly es-
tablished minimum. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 47-48. It was also argued that as
there had been no significant past foreign competition, this same happy state would con-
tinue even though domestic costs had increased. Id. at 48. The statistics invoked in re-
gard to past trade were thus of little probative force, a fact admitted by Hinrichs of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (Record 183). The estimate in the Textile case that a given
minimum would not cause substantial curtailment of employment rests, in so far as it is
based on evidence, solely on data with respect to expected increases in total manufactur-
ing cost and selling price.
(b) it also appears that the Textile case considered it of persuasive significance that
there was no substantial curtailment of employment as a result of the much larger in-
creases in wages essayed under the National Industrial Recovery Act. This testimony
was probably irrelevant as increases in man hours worked during 1933 and 1934 were
probably not due to code labor provisions. See LYONS et at., THE NATIoNAL ROVEUY
ADmrI ISTRA io (1935) 756-75. In recent opinions the Administrator has probably real-
ized the undesirability of use of NRA statistics; at any rate, he no longer invokes them
when writing opinions.
(c) it also appears that the Textile case refers to profit margins in the textile indus-
try. The Textile Industry Committee reported, somewhat incautiously, that Bureau of
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with respect to whether a given minimum will substantially curtail em-
ployment or give a competitive advantage in the industry or in any
classification thereof. The textile industry committee and the Admin-
istrator apparently regarded further types of data as unnecessary to
enable it to make findings upon these issues.
There remains much statistical data, not submitted to committees, yet
relevant to the question of whether or not a wage change will sub-
stantially curtail employment or give a competitive advantage. Since
capacity to absorb a given wage increase commonly determines the effect
of the wage increase upon employment, general data with respect to
profitability must be considered if wage fixation is to rest upon sound
statistical foundation. But neither the Wage and Hour Administration
nor any employer group subjected to a wage order has ever introduced
general evidence with respect to ability to absorb given wage increases.'
0'
An individual producer may frequently object that a given wage increase
will put him out of business. This argument is usually met by evidence
that other individual producers in the industry can afford the given
increase.
In the early cases an additional argument in rebuttal was that the mar-
ginal producer should and would avail himself of technological advances.
It was not deemed necessary to buttress the argument by evidence that
mechanization would be feasible for the plants hardest hit. Clearly,
"Congress did not intend that a committee's recommendation should le
disapproved because of lack of up-to-date methods in a few peculiarly
situated plants. . .. It is also clear that Congress did not intend that a
Committee's recommendation should be disapproved because such mar-
ginal plants are unable to maintain modern standards of efficiency already
Labor Statistics data on profits in the cotton textile industry between January, 1933 and
June, 1936 indicated that the minimum would not effect substantial decreases in industry
profits. See Wages in Cotton-Goods .Manufacturing, Bur. of Labor Statistics Bull. No.
663 (1938) 4; Report, Textile Industry Committee, supra note 36, at 18-19. The
Administrator was careful to point out, however, that there was no profit data for the
years since 1936. There were witnesses to the general profitability of the industry dur-
ing 1937 (Record 104, 1434), and to the decline of mill margins since that date. Bur.
Labor Statistics Bull. No. 663 (1938). It was suggested, however, that mill margins
were probably not an accurate measure of profit margins (Record 1898).
(d) it also appears that an effort was made to demonstrate that there %as sufficient
excess capacity in the industry to "take up such business as might be lost by mills em-
ploying 5, 7, 10 or considerably higher proportions of the total employment." (Testimony
of Newman Arnold Tolles, Record 461). But as output per man would be higher after
absorption, there would be curtailment. .Moreover, even local curtailment of employ-
ment with eventual absorption might be serious. See also Apparel Industry, supra note
38, at 69, 70, 75, 144, 282-83.
101. Relevant general data w\as submitted in the Puerto Rico NecdIctork case. Puer-
to Rico Needlework Industry, supra note 57, at 26. For more typical evidence intro-
duced by the government see Hosiery Industry, sitpra note 41, at 91.
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being utilized by a large number of plants and con'equently may not
survive the minimum."' 10 2  Employers then cotintered by pointing out
that the statutory mandate to avoid substantial curtailment of employ-
ment was not necessarily complied with by a wage order which resulted
in only a few business failures. A wage rate which induced mechaniza-
tion might be improper because it aggravated severely technological
unemployment. This objection was met in the Textile case by the con-
tentiOn that mechanization was neither caused nor accelerated by the
enactment of a minimum wage. Without any attempt to show the rele-
vance of the observation to the case at hand, it was also pointed out
that mechanization does not necessarily result in net unemploymeiht. 03
It was eventually realized, however, that it was not quite consistent to
maintain that manufacturers would mechanize to decrease costs and at
the same time that increases in the wage bill would not stimulate but
only accompany mechanization. Consequently, the opinions in recent cases
generally make no mention of the effects of increases in the wage bill
upon mechanization.
It may also be suggested that the data considered in determining effects
of wage-fixation on costs and prices is of questionable weight because
it can be employed only to determine the effect of each minimum wage
withotit reference to the effect of other minima. It was purportedly
shown that neither the minimum in the textile industry nor any minimum
set by the apparel industry alone had serious effect upon the price of
shirts. But the important question- the combined effect upon the price
of shirts of the statutory minima, the apparel minima and the textile
minimum- was ignored."0 4 Proof by private representatives of the
combined effects of various minima was generally deemed irrelevant. 10°
But if such proof is irrelevant, even the statutory mandate to avoid sub-
stantial curtailment of employment "in the industry" may be nullified. 10
102. Hosiery Industry, supra note 41, at 66-67.
103. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 37, The report of the textile industry com-
mittee indicates that the committee found it "difficult" to discuss the problem of mechani-
zation. Report, Textile Industry Committee, supra note 36, at 21. The direct effects of
mechanization were studied thoroughly, however, by the railroad industry committee.
See Report, Railway Industry Committee, supra note 55. Even this report did not take
account of the indirect effects of mechanization, for example on employment in the in-
dustries producing the mechanized equipment. For a full theoretical analysis of the rela-
tionship of mechanization and employment see JEROME, MECHANIZATION IN INDUSTRY
(1934).
104. The combined effect of statutory minima and of the wage order under considera-
tion was deliberately ignored in Apparel Industry, supra note 38, at 135.
105. Ibid.; cf. Hosiery Industry, supra note 41, at 33, n. 65.
106. Added elements of uncertainty are present when the statistical methods are not
employed with care. For instances of failure to sample adequately see Apparel Industry,
supra note 38, at 96. See also Puerto Rico Needlework Industry, supra note 57, at 21-23.
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Differentials Baid upon Cost of Liing
Cost of living data'introduced before the industry committee is also
inconclusive. In the Textile Industry case the study of the Wage and
Hour Division was given determinative weight.
1 7 In making this study
the Bureau of Labor Statistics priced identical objects in 32 cities, in-
cluding five Southern and five Northern cities with populations of from
10,000 to 19,000. The record in the Opp case does not indicate that the
32 cities bore any special relation to the textile industry. The failure to
sample communities having less than 5,000 population was not explained.
Thus, an expert witness of the Wage and Hour Division has testified
that the sample was inadequate to show any correlation between the
cost of living and the size of cities.1' s Furthermore, there was no satis-
factory indication of systematic selection of articles priced in the study.
And there was no explanation of the failure to differentiate between the
cost of living for single persons and for persons with dependents or of
the failure to distinguish between the cost of living for men and the
cost of living for women.
The record in the Opp case does reveal, however, that identical articles
were priced differently in different localities on the supposition that
differences in cost of living can be measured only by pricing the cost
of a standardized budget in each locality under consideration. The
soundness of this method of ascertaining the cost of living was disputed
107. There was evidence that American Federation of Labor and Natiunal Industrial
Conference Board studies agreed with the Wage and Hour Division studies. Report,
Textile Industry Committee, supra note 36, at 55.
Methods used in preparing Wage and Hour Division Study: The budget used in
preparing a study of the cost of living in 22 cities %%-as a "maintenance budget" (Report,
Textile Industry Committee, supra note 36, at 52) based on the needs of a husband, wife
and two children. The same methods were used in computing the budget that were used
in computing the W.P.4. "maintenance" budget. In re the Recommendation of the Shoe
Industry Committee, Hearings before the Wage & Hour Adm'r (1939) 99 ct seq. The
study of the cost of living in ten other cities, including two cities having a population of
between 10,000 and 19,000, was made by pricing a customary budget for a northern wage
earner's family and a customary budget for a southern wage earner's family in both
North and South, and by determining the average difference between North and South
in the cost of both budgets. Allowance was made for the effect of the %armer southern
climate on fuel and housing requirements. The effect of climate on total requirements
of clothing, food and miscellaneous items (including furniture and furnishings and house-
hold equipment) was found negligible. Industry Committee Exhibit No. 7, In re the
Recommendations of Industry Committee for the Knitted Outerwear Industry, Hear-
ings before the Wage & Hour Adm'r (1940). The data for 23 of the cities was
gathered in 1938. The data for the cities having populations of between 10,000 and
19,000 w,%as gathered in 1939. For an excellent -discussion of methods employed in cost
of living studies see Williams, Factors to be Considered in Measuring Intercity and
Interregional Differences in Living Costs (1940) 35 J. Am. STAT. Ass'.,; 471.
108. Record 454: "I do not believe that we have enough information to generalize as
to consistent differences in costs of living by the size of city." Cf. Williams, supra note
107, at 480-81.
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by an expert witness for a group of Southern employers who contended
that a cost of living study should be made by gathering statistics with
respect to expenditures of low income groups in different localities rather
than by pricing identical items in different localities. In affirming the
Textile Industry Committee's decision to adopt the Wage and Hour
Division's method of ascertaining the cost of living, the Wage and Hour
Administrator stated that:
"The test for determining the cost of living in different geograph-
ical regions to which the recommendations will apply is the monetary
sum required to purchase an equal standard of living including
equally desirable food from the standpoint of the consumer. Although
regional variations in types of consumers goods may be taken into
account, it would not appear to be permissible for the purposes of
this act to place one region on a standard which determines adequacy
of diet merely by the chemical ingredients of the food."'"9
Apparently, it is permissible for the purposes of the Act to place all
regions on a standard which appropriate Bureau of Labor Statistics
experts regard as "satisfying."
The Wage and Hour Division's study of the cost of living purported
to show 4.6 per cent as the difference in living costs between North
and South, and disclosed a very slight average difference between cost
of living in small and large communities."' The study showed larger
differences in living costs among communities of the same size than
between the average for communities of any given size and the average
for communities of any other given size; differences in the cost of living
in different communities in the same geographical area, whether in the
North or in the South, were greater than the difference between the
Northern average and the Southern average. The lowest and highest
cost cities were both found in the North. The Industry Committee and
the Wage and Hour Administrator concluded upon tle basis of this data
109. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 81. A more frank statement is perhaps that
of Adnlinistrator Fleming when he stated that a 3% difference in the cost of living was
"hardly great enough to make much of a fuss about," and that a schedule of slightly dif-
ferent rates everywhere is impossible of enforcement. Fleming, Address before New
England Shoe & Leather Ass'n, Wage & Hour Release No. G-23, April 17, 1940, at 7.
110. Testimony of Newman Arnold Tolles, Assistant to the Chief Economist, Wage
and Hour Division, Record 452. It is urged that even the 4.6% figure may exaggerate the
difference between the cost of living in the North anl South. It was said in the Knitted
Outerwear case that: "It is also significant, in view of the fact that expenditures for
food and clothing constitute a relatively large proportion of the spending pattern at low
income levels, that with respect to these.groups of items costs in the South were as high
as, or higher than, costs in the North. Inasmuch as the ,urveys contemplated an annual
income averaging about $1200 or $1300, whereas the incomes of workers in this Indus-
try average substantially less than $950 a year, it is probable that actual North-South
differentials within this industry are considerably smaller than the differentials estimated
as stated above." Knitted Outerwear Industry, supra note 38, at 36.
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that it was impractical to establish regional differentials based on living
costs.11
The study introduced in the Textile case has also formed the basis
for all other industry committee determinations that the cost of living
does not require the establishment of differentials. A \VPA survey of
the cost of living in 59 cities has now been brought down to September
15, 1938 and has been introduced as additional evidence at recent wage
hearings.lU
There has thus been what amounts to a complete failure of proof
of consequential differences in the cost of living. Existing evidence, there-
fore, does not justify industry committees in establishing differentials
based upon differences in the cost of living. But even if the cost of
living were investigated elaborately, it does not follow that the Admin-
istrator would permit differentials based solely upon differences in real
wages. In fact, the Administrator has asserted that Congress did not
intend that workers whose living costs are lower should therefore be
paid lower wages.1 3
Differentials Based upon Transportation Costs
Data upon transportation costs submitted to industry committees and
considered by the Wage and Hour Administration is insufficient to
afford a complete picture of distribution of the burden of transporta-
tion charges. This is amply attested by examination of the record in
the Opp case. Experts who appeared before the Administrator to contest
the validity of the Industry Committee's thirty-two and one-half cents
recommendation pointed out that all rail rates for finished cotton goods
were higher from specific Southern points to the major New York
market than were corresponding rates from New England.'" New
Englanders countered by pointing out that some such differences were
not the result of discrimination but only of greater distance, 13 that some
111. The figure for New York, N. Y., was 22.9% higher than that for Hanover, Pa.;
that for Baltimore, Md., wvas 12.6% higher than that for Sherman, Texas. Report, Tex-
tile Industry Committee, supra note 36, at 3-4: "The Committee determined that - . .
the gross differences in the cost of living seems (sic) to us unimportant in view of the
fact that the minimum wage we recommend provides, at best, a very low level of living."
112. Knitted Outerwear, supra note 38, at 35.
113. Hosiery Industry, supra note 41, at 83. ". . . in view of the findings that pro-
duction costs and transportation costs do not affect competitive conditions between any
such regions, I conclude that those assumed differences in living costs could not alone
be cause for a classification within the meaning of §8(c) of the Act." Nor does the
cost of living set a bottom limit to wages. Cf. Puerto Rico Needlework Industry, supra
note 57, at 17, n. 24, indicating that a wage less than an amount equal to the cost of
living will be set, if it is necessary to prevent substantial curtailment of employment. See
also Perlman, supra note 95, at 7.
114. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 92-93.
115. Testimony of James P. Harrington, Record 603, 606-7; Testimony of X. L
Hatch, Record 615-24; Testimony of A. H. Ferguson, Record 632-36.
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Southern points had more advantageous 'rates to the New York market
than some New England points,1 that Southern points having all rail
disadvantages to the New York market have advantages by the use of
both rail and water or truck transportation,' 7 that Southern gray goods
makers could sometimes pass the disadvantages of increased transporta-
tion costs on to Northern finishers, and, finally, that Southern manu-
facturers might be on competitive equality or even on a competitive
advantage with Northern manufacturers in sales to Midwestern, Southern
and Far Western markets. 118 The process of "considering" transporta-
tion cost approximated farce when numerous witnesses suggested that
it was improper to consider the effect of rail rates upon ability to com-
pete unless the administrative agency examined the effect of such rates
on raw material costs," 9 on the costs of unfinished products, and on the
cost of transporting machinery employed in the mills. 1 20  It was also
pointed out that transportation cost differentials, even if fairly large,
are not significant items in the total cost of finished cotton cloth and
hence will not have any great effect upon ability to compete in the sale
of finished cloth. 2 '
The industry committee concluded that "If wage rates were to be
granted to equalize the transportation costs for all mills to all markets,
the task would be fantastic and impossible of achievement. 22 . . . Such
an attempt would create more problems than it would solve leading to
new demands for differential treatment."'' 2 3 In such circumstances the
Fair Labor Standards Act apparently requires no differential to be based
upon transportation rates.
Collective Bargaining Agreements, Production Costs,
Labor Standards Voluntarily Maintained
The statutory injunction to "consider" collective bargaining agreements,
production costs, and labor standards voluntarily maintained appears to
116. Record 598-99.
117. Record 606.
118. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 92-93. See generally, Testimony of Mr. James
H.. McCann, Transportation Mgr. Associated Industries of Massachusetts, Record
650-51.
119. Textile Industry, szpra note 37, at 89. Certain sections of the South had advan-
tages in the rates on raw materials. Appendix B, supra note 90, at 50 et seq. Rates
on gray goods and on yarn are comparatively unimportant because the Northern mills
now produce only a small fraction of yarn and cotton goods for shipment in the gray.
Id. at 54-55.
120. Testimony of H. D. Arnold, Textile Traffic Ass'n., Record 643.
121. Textile Industry, supra note 37, at 98; Appendix B, supra note 90, at 43, 49.
122. Report, Textile Industry Committee, supra note 36, at 47. It has been said that
these conclusions were reached without even considering the Wage and Hour Division's
memorandum on freight rates. Minority Report, Textile Industry Committee, Record 170.
123. Report, Textile Industry Committee, supra note 36, at 52.
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be of even less significance in the course of industry committee delib-
erations than the statutory command to "consider" "living" and "trans-
portation costs." Cost of living and railroad rate data have at least been
presented in statistical form and with official authentication. On the other
hand, the Wage and Hour Division has introduced no general evidence
of differences in costs of production, or in rates promulgated by col-
lective agreements or conscientious employers. Since the Administrator
treats evidence of particular instances of hardship as irrelevant, the
statutory mandate to give due regard to these factors will be completely
ineffective unless private interests present a statistical picture of tie
effect of these factors. The record in the Opp case suggests reasons why
such statistical examination is unlikely.
In the Opp case, employees, with the consent of the Administrator,
declined to offer in evidence collective agreements on the ground that
they were analogous to trade secrets. Employers, on the other hand,
refused to accept secondary evidence of trade agreenlent rates in effect
in various areas. As a consequence, private action will result in no pre-
sentation of general evidence of trade union rates except in the even-
tuality that a union wishes, or an industry committee demands, that
secondary evidence be introduced. Secondary evidence introduced by an
interested party is in any event of little probative value. The only sta-
tistical study of miscellaneous production costs considered in the Textile
case was a study of obsolescence in Southern mills introduced by the
Textile Workers' Union. Data with respect to the tax burden, power
costs and construction costs was fragmentary. No evidence was intro-
duced on the question of standards maintained by employers voluntarily
maintaining fair labor standards since a number indicated that no
employer voluntarily announces standards below which lie will not permit
wages to sink.Y4
Thus, it is abundantly clear that no wage determination is compelled
by statistical analysis of the effect of wage increases upon costs, prices,
and employment; or by quantitative appraisal of living, transportation,
and miscellaneous production costs; or by comprehensive survey of wage
rate patterns resulting from collective agreements or from wage standards
voluntarily maintained. In view of the inadequacies of proof, the Admin-
istrator might choose either of two alternative paths. He might, on the
one hand, accept without serious question industry committee deter-
minations on the theory that they are not wholly unreasonable. This is
apparently the course adopted when an industry committee promulgates
uniform rates. Not only is it feasible for a committee to reach almost
any conclusion with respect to the total volume of unemployment which
124. For the Administrator's treatment of this evidence, see Voolen Industry, spra
note 41, at 20; Pulp & Primary Paper Industry, Wage & Hour Release No. G-59, July
18, 1940, at 19, 21. Hosiery Industry, supra note 41, at 86.
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may be caused by a uniform wage rate, but, in addition, the Administrator
permits the committee to reach a variety of conclusions with respect to
that volume of unemployment which should be treated as substantial.
A committee may hold that no substantial curtailment results although
10 per cent to 15 per cent of the employees in the industry may be
affected or although a wage increase of 25 per cent is contemplated.
1 2
It may hold, on the other hand, that substantial curtailment of employ-
ment will result if the rate is not set low enough to permit adjustment
by even the weakest units in the industry.
126
The Administrator may, however, test the adequacy of industry com-
mittee determinations, not by reference to whether or not they are sup-
ported by evidence, but by whether or not they conform to policies which
the Administrator regards as harmonious with the purposes of the statute.
This method of inquiry has been adopted by the Administrator in testing
the soundness of the view that differentials should be awarded. In view
of the policy in favor of treating competitors equally, a differential
establisfied by an industry committee will not be sustained unless the
committee can sustain the difficult burden of showing that the differential
the average cost of seven or eight samples of each of several products. Sampling was
probably inadequate since the samples of a given product in several instances varied
more in cost than the average cost of the samples of the product varied from the average
cost of the samples of any other product investigated.
The method of proof described in the text has been supplemented by an a priori judg-
mnent that consumers can be educated to pay higher prices without resulting decreases in
demand. E.g., id., at 21-22.
125. Meaning of the formula "substantial curtailment of employment":
(a) Percentages of employees affected: If a wage order affects only the employment
of "less than a widely scattered 9 percent of the employees" in an industry, there is no
substantial curtailment of employment. Millinery Industry, supra note 89, at 28. Speak-
ing in reference to the men's neckwear and scarf industry, the Administrator has said:
"I conclude, therefore, that not more than 15 percent of the employees in the Industry
are working in plants which will be the most severely taxed by the proposed minimum
and that, even assuming some curtailment of employment among this group, there will not
result any substantial curtailment of employment or dislocation of employment in the
Industry as a whole from the application of the proposed minimum to these lower than
average wage plants." Apparel Industry, supra note 38, at 318.
(b) Extent of wage rise necessary in order to affect employment: Increase of the
average wage bill in New Orleans by 26% and of total cost of production by 8% does
not constitute ground for believing that "substantial curtailment" of employment will
result when New Orleans manufacturers absorbed much greater increases during the
X.R.A. period and when they will still have a substantial wage advantage after enact-
ment of the wage order. Id. at 37. But whether or not the result would have been
different if a group larger than the group of New Orleans manufacturers had had to
make similar large adjustments remains a question.
126. This apparently was the approach adopted in the Railway Industry case, See
Minority Report, Railway Industry Committee, Wage & Hour Release No. G-68, Aug.
23, 1940, at 1-2. The Railway Committee recommendations have now been approved by
the Administrator. But see opposition of many railroads to wage order. Wage & Hour
Release No. R-1057, Sept. 24, 1940.
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is necessary to preserve the employment or competitive position of a
group definable by any of the standards used to segregate a group, or
an industry branch or classification.127 Moreover, the Administrator has
ruled that a producer is not subject to a competitive disadvantage justi-
fying a differential in his favor if, after a wage order establishing a
uniform minimum wage rate, he will still pay lower rates on the average
than his competitors.12  Adoption of this view leaves little scope for
operation of the statutory clauses permitting establishment of differ-
entials.
COMPARISON OF INDUSTRY COMMITTEE METHOD WITH
OTHER WAGE-FIXATION TECHNIQUES
The weaknesses of the methods of administration employed under the
industry committee provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act tend
to indicate not that the industry committee technique should be replaced,
but only that administrative techniques must be improved. For deficiencies
in the administration of the industry committee provisions cannot be
cured by change in law, but only, if at all, by closer attention to the
tasks of fact-gathering and public persuasion.
The soundness of these conclusions may be tested by comparing the
advantages and disadvantages which experience under the Fair Labor
127. In several cases it has been held that the Administrator will not consider un-
employment "substantial" unless it is caused within a "determinate" or "definite" group.
Apparel Industry, supra note 38, at 66-67, 75, 85, 195-96, 318. This criterion will gener-
ally prevent the establishment of differentials based upon geographical areas since "from
all available evidence, relatively few states constitute homogeneous wage areas." Perl-
man, suPra note 95, at 5. When an industry committee establishes different wage rates
for groups not established as definably distinct, the classification will be set aside unless
supported by evidence. Cf. id. at 357. Affirmative evidence must be of the hind dis-
cussed in the text accompanying note 41 supra. But if there is a reasonable conflict in
evidence, the Industry Committee's determinations of appropriate branches and classifi-
cations will be permitted to stand. Cf. Apparel Industry, spra note 38, at 321.
128. This formulation receives the most e-plicit support in the opinions of the Ad-
ministrator in those cases in which the group claiming a differential will have an average
hourly differential in its favor even after enactment of the proposed flat minimum.
E.g., in the Hat case, the independent front shops argued that they could not com-
pete with the integrated shops unless they were awarded a differential. The Adminis-
trator answered this contention by stating: ". . . the proposed 40-cent minimum will
not, if adopted, impair the ability of any group of plants to compete; the independent
front shops will have a differential in their favor of 142 cents in average hourly vwages."
Hat Industry, mpra note 41, at 35; see also Apparel Industry, mspra note 38, at 72, 135.
The rule in the Hat case would preclude the award of differentials in nearly all cases,
inasmuch as minima generally narrow but do not complctely renoz'e pre-existing mage
differentials.
It is also supported by the statement (attributed to a witness but cited with apparent
approval by the Administrator) that "A differential established in small towns because
the cost of living in these towns is lower will give plants located there a competitive
advantage." Shoe Industry, supra note 89, at 45, n. 107.
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Standards Act discloses as characteristic of the industry committee
method of wage fixation with the merits and demerits to be expected
from other methods of wage fixation.
If the industry committee technique is compared with wage fixation
by a flat statutory minimum, it may be criticized for failure to effectuate
rapid universal wage rate coverage. But failure to extend coverage is
unobjectionable in so far as it results from reluctance to cover industries
which cannot afford to pay higher wages. Generally, moreover, the in-
dustry committee technique of wage fixation results in slow extension
of coverage because with limited funds it is impossible to attempt thorough
concurrent investigation of more than a few wage structures. That such
investigation is necessary in order to avoid the imposition of wage rates
which either will be ignored or will result in extensive unemployment
has been demonstrated: a statutory thirty cent minimum wage, enacted
without satisfactory investigation of wage structures, resulted in dis-
ruption of the Puerto Rican economy. 2 and in serious dislocation of
the American pecan-shelling industry.'
On the other hand, if the industry committee method of wage fixation
is contrasted not with a rigid system of wage fixation by statutory rule,
but with extension of wage coverage by private agreement and coercion,
the superiority of the industry committee method is also patent. The
chief argument for return to wage regulation by private action points
not to the merits of private regulation but to the futility of industry
committee action. Wage regulation by industry committees is said to
constitute little more than collective bargaining.' The federal govern-
129. Two-fifths of the Puerto Rico laborers subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act
earned less than 30 cents an hour. Two YEARS OF THE FAiR LABOR STANDARDS AcT, op.
cit. supra note 13. For details with respect to average wages in Puerto Rico, see ANN. RFI,.
COAM'R OF LABOR PUERTO Rico, 1937-38 (1938), at 61, 68-71; 1 Puerto Rico Labor News
202-03 (1938). Attempt to enforce the statutory minimum in Puerto Rico resulted in
the lockout of persons employed in the tobacco stripping industry. 2 id. 122 (1939). It
has been asserted that the important needlework industry was completely destroyed by
the Spring of 1940. 23 FORTUNE 91, 129 (Feb., 1941). Contra: Puerto Rico Needlework
Industry, supra note 57, at 33-34. Successive governors of Puerto Rico urged that the
Fair Labor Standards Act should not apply to the Islands. 3 Puerto Rico Labor News
76 (1940). The Wage and Hour Division recognized that the flat minima enacted by
the Fair Labor Standards Act could not be enforced in Puerto Rico. Ibid. Congress ulti-
mately exempted Puerto Rico from the Fair Labor Standards Act, and provided a sys-
tem of special industry committees for Puerto Rico. Pub. Res. 88, c. 432, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1940).
130. See 3 LAB. REL. REP. (Sec. 2) 360 (1938); 2 WAGE & HOUR REP. 4 (1939).
Even employers admit that in other industries the Fair Labor Standards Act flat minina
have had insignificant effect in the continental United States. See, e.g., Report, Dep't of
Mfr. Comm., U. S. Chamb. of Comm. (1939); cf. Hinrichs, Effects of the 25-cent Mini-
mm Wage (1940) 35 J. Amr. STAT. Ass'Dr 13, at 23. By the same token a statutory mini-
mum low enough to result in no serious hardship is of little effect in raising wage rates.
131. Ai-r'v G, 's Comm., supra note 35, at 39. It has been observed by all interests
that the data presented to industry committees is frequently ignored. See Shishkin, Wage
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ment, it is argued, is not justified in financing collective bargaining, par-
ticularly if awards cannot be adequately enforced. It is true that wage
fixation by industry committee action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act bears many resemblances to a collective bargaining process. Industry
committees are selected in part because of the existence of interests
demanding their formation.'a' Moreover, it is not reasonable to suppose
that bargaining will ever be eliminated if wage fixation is conducted by
interested persons. Economic data presently introduced before industry
committees appointed under the Fair Labor Standards Act is apparently
insufficient to compel purely scientific conclusions with respect to the
effect of wage increases upon all units of the industry. Moreover, per-
fection of the tools of statistical analysis cannot eliminate a margin for
bargaining arising from the necessity of choosing from among con-
flicting interpretations of the statutory mandate.
To admit that there are important elements of bargaining in the in-
dustry committee process is not to admit, however, that the process is
solely one of bargaining. Even under an industry committee procedure
which places the Administrator under strong practical pressure to affirm
industry committee determinations, 133 the Administrator is able to exer-
cise powers of control which are significant to the economy as a whole.
Through exercise of the power to determine the order in which industries
are covered, he may assert a basic policy of raising first the wages of the
lowest paid laborers or of relocating industry in accord with a plan for
the development and allocation of national resources. In contrast, a wage
rate structure resulting from the vectors of private coercion and agree-
Hour Lazu Administration from Labor's rie-wpoint (1939) 29 Am. LAn. LEis. REV. 63
("There has been a tendency to arrive at wage recommendations blind-folded by drawing
lots rather than by careful weighing of all the facts.") Employer members have fre-
quently pointed out that the interval between presentation of economic information to an
industry committee and decision by the committee may be so short (12 hours or less) as
to warrant the conclusion that the industry committee did not consider the economic data
placed before it. See 2 WAGE & HOUR REP. 522-23 (1939); ATrT'Y GEr,"s Comm:s., supra
note 35, at 39-40. In some cases, however, public representatives have reported that full
and fair consideration was given to wage orders. Ibid.
132. See p. 1151 mpra.
133. Under the industry committee provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Administrator can only affirm or reverse industry committee determinations. If he re-
verses, he must resubmit the issues to an industry committee. Under these circumstances,
the Administrator is under strong practical pressure to affirm. If he failed to affirm, he
would be accused of unreasonable delay in administration, of incompetence in selecting
the personnel of industry committees, of wasting funds provided for Wage and Hour
Administration, and of failing to foster that cooperation between private groups and the
Wage and Hour Administration which is essential if the Fair Labor Standards Act is to
be adequately enforced. It is only in cases in which industry committees distinguished
between rates for different work without being able to make any intelligible argument in
favor of the distinction that the Administrator has undertaken to reverse wage deter-
minations.
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ment hardly effects any planning function. Furthermore, by proper use
of the power to define industries, the Administrator can prevent wasteful
jurisdictional conflicts. On the other hand, extension of wage coverage
by the unplanned methods of private action must inevitably result in
jurisdictional controversies. The industry committee method, unlike
private regulation, permits the public to have a voice in wage settle-
ments. Finally, when wages are fixed under governmental aegis, Admin-
istrator and court may intervene to curb wilfully unfair treatment of
groups that would be without remedy, were wage fixation regarded as a
domain for private regulation.
But even if the industry committee method of wage fixation amounted
to nothing more than a system of collective bargaining, it would still be
worth retaining. Admittedly, the inadequacies of statistical data presently
employed by the industry committees render inconclusive the statistical
information with which they are supplied. Present methods are, how-
ever, subject to growth and supplementation. Better factual investigation
may result from vigorous coordination of relevant material already
gathered by governmental agencies and from better use of the annals
of trade associations and unions. Elimination of duplicatory sources of
information may be attempted in order to free resources for use in
securing data upon questions as yet unexplored. It may be possible to
tabulate profit margins in industries before and after they are subjected
to wage orders. Statistical study of the effects of wage rises attributable
to mechanization and to the speed-up is not inconceivable. Machinery
may be developed which permits continuous aggregation of relevant facts,
and the modification of wage orders whenever the circumstances upon
which they are based become altered.13 4 Even if the information devel-
oped proves no more than a slight check upon collective bargaining, it
will still constitute a valuable addition to the store of knowledge which
must constitute the basis for any valuable program of national planning.
Criticism of the Administration has also cited the unmethodical repre-
sentation of conflicting groups on industry committees. But a sound
system of industrial democracy must rest upon continuous experimenta-
tion with methods of industrial representation. Failure to secure adequate
representation of unorganized labor by union officials may lead to efforts
to effectuate the more complete organization of labor or to representation
of the unorganized by impartial state or federal administrators. 18 Con-
134. It has been suggested that frequent alteration of minima may discommode busi-
nessmen who must be in a position to calculate business costs for some time in advance.
Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 584-85, 949. It is doubtful, however, that provision
for flexible adjustment of wages in accord with fluctuations in the cost of living would
seriously disturb cost calculations.
135. In two instances the Wage and Hour Administrator has permitted representa-
tion of unorganized labor by persons who are not union officials: (1) When the Wage
and Hour Administrator appointed an industry committee for the Puerto Rican Needle-
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tinuation of the industry committee technique, even in a minor segment
of the economy, seems a promising method of developing the necessary
experience with methods of industrial representation.
It can be urged that a system which involved flexible wage fixation by
administrative officials unchecked by the action of industry committees
would have the same advantages as a system of wage fixation by indus-
try committees. Moreover, it might have the additional advantage of
assuring parity in rates fixed for closely related industries. The legis-
lative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the history of other
wage-fixing experiments, however, indicate the probable political in-
feasibility of such a method of wage fixation.100 And even if the method
is feasible, it seems undesirable. The road to stable industrial democracy
is in the long run traversed, not by excluding from industrial government
persons whose interests are affected, but by educating them to assume
governmental responsibility.'37
work Trade, he appointed an official of the Puerto Rican Labor Department as a repre-
sentative for unorganized labor. Puerto Rican Needlework, supra note 57, at 13. This
course was necessary because the amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act provid-
ing for special industry committees for Puerto Rico (Pub. Res. 88, c. 432, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1940) as interpreted by Administrator Fleming, 3 Puerto Rico Labor News 76
(1940)) required the Administrator to appoint employee members of the industry com-
mittee who resided in Puerto Rico. The statutory command could not have been ob-yed
by appointing union officials since the needlework employees were completely unorgan-
ized. (2) A shop steward for the Stetson Company served as an employee representa-
tive on the Hat Industry Committee. Hat Industry, supra note 41, at S.
136. See note 29 supra.
137. Even with every effort to secure cooperation of employers serious difficulties
have been experienced in enforcing the statute. Investigation has frequently revealed
over fifty per cent non-compliance with some wage-orders. 3 WAGs & Hour Ru.P. 39
(1940) ; 4 id. at 81 (1941).
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